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 CONNECTED AIRCRAFT: CYBER-SAFETY RISKS, INSIDER THREAT, 
AND MANAGEMENT APPROACHES 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The past several years has witnessed significant 
growth in Internet Protocol (IP)-based wireless 
connections between airborne aircraft, satellites, and 
terrestrial information systems, a phenomenon some 
have termed The Connected Aircraft (Bellamy, 2014).  
Far eclipsing passenger high-speed Internet service, 
this movement is integrating thousands of embedded 
automated sensors connected to safety-critical 
systems, such as engines, flight controls, cockpit 
displays, and life support systems into the on-line 
infrastructure.  Airborne sensors continuously send 
data packets to worldwide airframe, engine, and 
avionics manufacturers, airline control centers, and 
third-party suppliers (Orjih, 2006).  The tremendous 
growth in the Internet of Things (IoT), small, low-
power, programmable, Internet-connected, smart 
devices, has accelerated the Connected Aircraft 
transformation (Lueth, 2014).  In short, winged local 
area networks are expanding the Internet to 30,000 
feet. However, connecting aircraft to the Internet is 
also exposing safety-critical airborne systems to 
serious cyber-physical safety risks, to which the 
traveling public is largely oblivious. This ignorance 
is likely to remain until, heaven forbid, a crash or 
other incident is directly linked to a successful 
cyberattack.  This research paper will attempt to 
narrow this knowledge gap by shedding light on the 
growing cyber-physical safety risks of The Connected 
Aircraft. Next, it will discuss insider threat in the 
airline industry. It will also suggest risk management 
approaches, some already underway, to help reduce 
these emerging cyber-safety risks so that the 
promising operational, economic, and business 
benefits of movement can be realized without 
exposing the traveling public to undue safety risk. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The combination of IoT devices and safety-
critical airborne systems produces serious cyber-
physical safety risks, to which the traveling public is 
largely oblivious. This state is likely to remain until, 
heaven forbid, an air disaster is directly linked to a 
successful cyberattack.  This research paper will 
attempt to narrow the knowledge gap by shedding 
some light on the growing cyber-physical safety risks 
of The Connected Aircraft.  Further, it will suggest 
risk management approaches, some already 
underway, to help reduce these emerging cyber-
safety risks and enable the promising operational, 
economic, and business benefits of the Connected 
Aircraft phenomenon to be realized without exposing 
the traveling public to undue safety risk. 
 
2. Background  
 
Aviation electronics, a.k.a. avionics, have been 
with us since shortly after World War II, when the 
cathode ray tube, portable radar systems, and radio 
frequency- (RF) based communication & navigation 
systems began proliferating (Wikipedia, 2017).  
Significant advances were made with the introduction 
of integrated circuits, satellite communications, and 
electronic inertial navigation systems in the 1970s 
and 80s.  The US Global Positioning System (GPS) 
was released for civilian use in the 1990s and was 
soon followed by several other constellations of 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) (Boyne 
& Crouch, 2016).  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
the liquid crystal display (LCD), digital/software-
driven cockpit control and display units (CDU), and 
integrated flight management systems (FMS) brought 
about the continuing era of the Glass Cockpit (Ashley 
& Attan, 2011).   
Airplanes truly began to morph into cyber-
physical systems with the introduction of Central Air 
Data Computers (CADC) driving all cockpit displays, 
full authority digital engine controls (FADEC) 
translating throttle movements to engine settings, 
digital fly-by-wire flight controls processing and 
communicating data from computers connected to 
physical cockpit controls to actuate external flight 
surfaces, and internal aircraft data busses to manage 
these growing airborne computer networks 
(Wikipedia, 2017).  It wasn’t until the about 2010 
however, with the introduction of airborne Internet 
access (Martin, 2009) and the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s (FAA) kickoff of the Next 
Generation Air Navigation System (NextGen) (FAA, 
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 2018) that the RF-to-IP transformation markedly 
accelerated.  The FAA’s three major NextGen 
priorities are: (1) transforming nearly 30,000 
terrestrial analog telecommunications circuits serving 
5,000 facilities, into a 100% Internet-based 
communications network, (2) decommissioning 
ground-based radio navigation aid systems and 
relying totally on airborne GPS/GNSS navigation 
signals, and (3) replacing RF-based Air Traffic 
Control voice communications with textual packet-
based data communications (like email/instant 
messaging) (FAA, 2016).  Even GPS/GNSS satellite 
signals are being converted from analog to digital 
format (Brooks, 2015).  With more and more ground, 
airborne, and space-based systems connecting via 
packet-based signals and the virtual explosion of 
embedded IP-based microprocessors and sensors 
joining the Internet, it is not difficult to understand 
that the Internet is expanding skyward. 
 
 
3. Cyber-Safety Risks of Connected 
Aircraft  
 
Dr. Edward Griffor in his Handbook of System 
Safety and Security, defines cyber-physical systems 
(CPS) as “systems that include both logical 
operations (such as control and feedback) and 
physical interactions, such as gathering information 
from the physical realm using sensors or taking an 
action or actuating that impacts the physical realm” 
(Griffor, 2016, p. 5).  
Sampigethaya and Poovendran, point to the 
Boeing 787 as an example of an “e-enabled aircraft” 
in their Institute of Electronics and Electrical 
Engineers (IEEE) paper Aviation Cyber–Physical 
Systems: Foundations for Future Aircraft and Air 
Transport, describing a combination of digital 
computing, storage, software, and networking that 
yields a “self-aware airborne node in a global 
information network” (Sampigethaya & Poovendran, 
2013, p. 1836).  The Connected Aircraft is another 
node in an emerging real-time network of airborne 
and ground service endpoints, sharing data on 
everything from flight parameters (airspeed, altitude, 
position, etc.), to engine temperatures, avionics 
status, and even brake wear (Bellamy, 2014).   
However, by giving wings to the Internet, we 
have also elevated the many terrestrial cyber risks 
into the inherently dangerous realm of high-speed, 
high-altitude, all-weather transportation.  
 
3.1. Integrated Modular Avionics 
  
Cybersecurity is a new paradigm in aviation, 
we’re going to have to protect the airborne and 
ground interfaces” John Craig, Chief Engineer, Cabin 
and Network Systems, Boeing Corp. (Bellamy, 
2014). 
Onboard avionics systems are being further 
transformed from an assortment of bus-federated 
modules, into a new Integrated Modular Avionics 
(IMA) architecture, employing multi-core, multi-
processor computers for higher performance and 
throughput.  This logical integration combines cabin 
environment, passenger entertainment, flight deck, 
flight control, system health, and other sub-
networks/nodes (including passenger carry-on 
devices) into an integrated ecosystem approaching 
the complexity and sophistication of software-defined 
networks (SDN) (Sampigethaya & Poovendran, 
2013).  Figure 1 illustrates a high-level IMA 
architecture. 
 
Figure 1.  Onboard Integrated Modular Avionics 
Architecture 
 
Boeing demonstrated the IMA business case on 
the 787 Dreamliner by replacing of over 100 separate 
onboard computers with one “Common Core 
System” (Ramsey, 2007, p. 1).   
Though avionics software goes through a much 
more rigorous quality/reliability certification process 
than terrestrial programming, IMA networks, by 
adopting the architecture and supporting technology 
of terrestrial SDNs, inherit very similar 
vulnerabilities (Cyber Security Intelligence Ltd, 
2015).  These vulnerabilities include misconfigured 
firewalls, reconfigurable communications links, low-
power wireless signals, weak (or no) cryptography, 
and loose traffic flow management layer permissions 
(Slavov, Migault, & Pourzandi, 2015).   
Successful attacks on these types of systems have 
been theorized, attempted, and accomplished.  
Software security firm founder John McAfee firmly 
believes that aircraft can be hacked (McAfee, 2016).  
In 2015, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) 
reported that aircraft could theoretically be hacked 
and commandeered by hackers penetrating firewalls 
between passenger entertainment systems and cockpit 
avionics (GAO, 2015).  Further, in 2015, aviation 
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 security researcher Chris Roberts, told the FBI he had 
hacked into the onboard network of a United Airlines 
flight by penetrating the passenger entertainment 
system from his seat on the plane.  Though his claims 
were disputed by others, he reportedly claimed to 
have “access[ed] in-flight networks about 15 times 
during various flights” (Zetter, 2015, p. 1) 
penetrating “the fuel balancing system and the thrust 
control system” (Zetter, 2015, p. 2).   
Finally, in a widely publicized 2017 
announcement, Robert Hickey, Program Manager of 
the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Cybersecurity Division, Science & Technology 
Directorate, announced that his team had successfully 
hacked into a parked DHS-owned Boeing 757 within 
two days after obtaining it, and with neither insider 
aid nor physical access (Biesecker, 2017) and 
(Paganini, 2017). 
 
3.2. Full Authority Digital Engine Controls 
(FADEC) 
  
Given that IMA architectures provide centralized 
access to other onboard digital systems, consider the 
cyber-safety risk of a hack into an airborne engine’s 
FADEC, which Chris Roberts also claimed to have 
accomplished (Zetter, 2015).  FADEC is a quite 
literal name in that this system has full authority over 
the engine it controls, i.e. no manual override 
(SCRIBD, 2018).  Pilots and auto-throttle systems 
(also computer-driven) send messages to FADECs 
much like homeowners send desired room 
temperature messages to “smart home” controllers.  
From the hacker’s point of view, he who controls the 
FADEC, controls the engine.  From the pilot’s 
perspective, he who controls the engines controls the 
aircraft.  Fortunately, airliners are required to have 
two FADEC’s per engine, but there is still just one 
IMA system.  
 
3.3. Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Broadcast (ADS-B) 
  
A less obvious cyber-safety consideration 
involves a relatively new technology called 
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-
B).  ADS-B is an efficient and effective system for 
networking airplanes and ground stations and is the 
FAA’s next step beyond 1940’s-era radar 
surveillance.  Relying on GPS/GNSS signals for 
accurate and precise position and timing, ADS-B 
gives air traffic managers a clearer operational air 
picture, enabling them to let aircraft fly closer 
together.  Pilots (and autopilots) use ADS-B for 
situational awareness, separation, and following other 
aircraft, as well as real-time graphical & textual 
weather information.  Figure 2 shows the ADS-B 
system as part of NextGen.  
 
 
Figure 2.  FAA NextGen with ADS-B 
ADS-B employs an unencrypted and 
unauthenticated network communications protocol 
that presents several attack vectors to hackers 
(Sizemore, 2017).  For example, a hacker could 
highjack the session of an airborne airliner and start 
sending packets indicating the aircraft is 
miles/thousands of feet away from its actual position.  
This could surprise and confuse air traffic managers, 
pilots, and autopilot systems, possibly causing an 
inflight collision.  It could also cause the autopilot 
and Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) of 
an airplane immediately near the new false position 
to unexpectedly react with an abrupt avoidance 
maneuver (Storm, 2012).  Since ADS-B is dependent 
on satellite signals, ADS-B ground stations, and 
onboard Wide Area Augmentation Systems (WAAS), 
these present three additional error injection 
pathways, i.e. threat vectors.  GPS spoofing is 
probably the easiest attack in this context, because 
low-power satellite signals are easily 
overcome/jammed (Zimmerman, 2013).  French 
researchers have also demonstrated that inserting 
“ghost aircraft” into the airborne ADS-B network 
could overwhelm the targeted geospatial area, 
causing denial of service (DoS) (Costin & Francillon, 
2012).    
 
3.4. Aircraft Health Management Systems 
  
IoT-enabled real-time automated aircraft health 
management systems, monitoring engines, structures, 
avionics, and other safety-of-flight systems, present 
another broad cyber-safety risk area.  IoT sensors are 
becoming more and more prevalent on aircraft, 
building automated wireless networks with 
continuous air-to-ground data transmission and 
collection nodes feeding huge databases. The Boeing 
Airplane Health Management (AHM) system, for 
example, ingests and analyzes terabytes of real-time 
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 data from over 2000 aircraft from 53 worldwide 
airlines on fuel performance, engine oil consumption, 
and numerous flight parameters (e.g. airspeed, 
altitude, etc.) (Boeing Corp., 2013).  Figure 3 shows 
Boeing 787 AHM data collection. Over 13,000 Rolls-
Royce engines, flying on roughly 9,000 commercial 
flights/day, continuously send data messages through 
SITAOnAir’s Aircom FlightMessenger service to 
Microsoft’s Azure cloud platform for aggregation 
and analysis by the Cortana Intelligence Suite 
(Bellamy, III, 2017). 
 
 
Figure 3.  Boeing Airplane Health Management 
System on 787 Dreamliner 
While hackers have many opportunities to 
frustrate health management systems, the more 
significant cyber-safety issues lie just ahead. 
Today’s systems simply stream down and analyze 
real-time data to prognosticate and prepare for 
ground maintenance operations.  The continuing 
quest for innovative cost efficiencies will likely 
soon drive on-wing/airborne maintenance.  In 
other words, why wait until an engine, autopilot, 
cabin pressure, or other digital/digitally-
controlled system arrives at an airport to fix a 
problem or perform routine 
inspection/maintenance when it can be done via a 
ground-to-air data-linked control of aircraft 
software, firmware, and hardware.  If this coming 
evolution keeps the equipment onboard for even 
few more flights, or provides maintainers earlier 
troubleshooting data, this “fix-in-flight” approach 
will likely be irresistible.  That miracle of 
networking technology however, will come the 
real possibility of global hackers penetrating, 
elevating privileges (if needed), and sending 
erroneous, harmful, or dangerous “fixes” to these 
systems while they cruise at 30,000 feet and 500 
miles per hour, perhaps over open ocean (think 
Malaysian Air Flight 370).  The challenge to 
hackers would be very enticing, making 
probability of attack significant.  The impact 
could be life-threatening. 
 
4. Insider Threat in the Air  
 
4.1. Corpus Overview 
As stated by Claycomb et al., a proven process 
exists for examining insider incidents and they 
involve several steps. One method is as follows: (1) 
Collect source data (e.g., documents, reports, etc.) on 
instances of insider crime. (2) Process case 
information using a repeatable and consistent process 
to store key information and events about the case. 
(3) Create chronological time-lines from case data. 
(4) Identify key events in the chronology of the 
attack. (5) Examine case chronologies to identify 
patterns of significant indicators of attack. (6) 
Compare results to baseline behaviors of assumed 
good populations. The approach used to develop this 
paper is to focus on steps (1), (2) and (5). The 
statistics and analysis that is generated are associated 
with the complete set of cases that we have included 
in our case study analysis (Claycomb, 2012). 
These incidents were queried from CERT’s Non-
Public Insider Incident Corpus containing nearly 
1600 incidents obtained through public sources. The 
purpose of these cases is to give the reader an idea of 
the breadth of the different inside incidents in airlines 
and transportation sector that we have analyzed. 
These cases involve a variety of different 
organizations, technical detail, and financial impact, 
recovery cost, and methods used for detection. The 
non-aviation transportation incidents selected for this 
analysis reflect incidents that were the most likely to 
affect the aviation sector. In other words, incidents 
where an insider attempted to form their own 
business were removed from consideration given 
how unlikely that would be in the airline industry. 
Though media reports of arrests of airline 
employee run the gamut from simple theft to drug 
trafficking to terrorist-inspired threats, they do not all 
meet the standard of information system involvement 
that warrants inclusion in the CERT Insider Threat 
Incident Corpus. 
In the two incidents categorized as Miscellaneous, 
one incident involved attempted terrorism and the 
other involved unauthorized disclosure of personally 
identifiable information (PII). 
 
4.1. Cases of Insider Threat Involving the 
Airline Industry 
 
Appendix A describes the very basic summary of 
10 cases associated with insiders with ties to the 
airline industry Internet taken from almost 1600 cases 
that we have obtained through public records such as 
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 court documents and through our relationships with 
partner agencies and organizations. The full summary 
of the cases is available by contacting the authors. 
Interestingly, we determined there were seven 
additional cases in our corpus that were too recent to 
be included in our analysis. We hope to analyze the 
additional cases as follow-on work to this paper.  
 
 
4.2. Insider Incident Metrics 
 
Confidentiality was impacted in 50% of incidents. 
Integrity was impacted in 50% of incidents. 
Availability was impacted in 30% of incidents. 
Confidentiality and integrity were both impacted in 
one incident. Integrity and availability were both 
impacted in two incidents. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Attack Location 
 
Attack location was known in 90% of incidents in 
the sample. Remote access was used in 60% of the 
incidents and on-site access was used in 50% of the 
incidents, with two incidents involving both remote 
and on-site access. 
 
Attack Time 
 
 
Figure 5.  Attack Location 
 
Attack time was known in 60% of the incidents in 
the sample. Insiders attacked during work hours in 
50% of incidents and outside of work hours in 20% 
of incidents, with one incident where the attack took 
place during and outsider of work hours. 
In incidents where the insider’s gender was 
known (90%), the insider was male.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Insider Tenure 
 
Although insider tenure was known in only 60% 
of incidents in the sample, it is interesting to note that 
half of those insiders had been with a victim 
organization for five years or more. In fact, those 
insiders had tenure of 6, 17, and 25 years 
respectively. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Insider Age 
 
Given the tenure ranges of the insiders, it follows 
that at least half of the insiders would be at least 31 
years old.  
There was only one incident where an insider was 
associated with organized crime and no incidents 
where an insider was involved with the Internet 
underground. However, there were two instances 
(20%) where an insider took part in collusion with 
outsiders. There were no incidents that were known 
to involve insider accomplices. 
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 Figure 8.  Insider Citizenship 
 
Half of the insiders were US citizens, with an 
additional insider that was a naturalized citizen. In 
the three incidents where citizenship was unknown, 
one insider was unidentified / unnamed, another was 
prosecuted at the state level (so the information was 
unavailable), and the third was likely a US native, but 
this has yet to be confirmed. 
The one incident where the insider was not a US 
citizen was the only foreign case in the sample. 
However, the insider was a non-citizen in the country 
where the incident took place. 
 
4.3. Insider Incident Precursors 
 
Fifty-percent of incidents in the sample were 
precipitated by the termination of an insider’s 
employment. Twenty-percent of cases were 
precipitated by a confrontation involving the insider. 
(Two incidents involved both termination and 
confrontation.) Other precursors across the remaining 
5 incidents were unique, i.e., passed over, 
unexplained wealth, relocation, etc. 
 
4.4. Insiders Motive 
 
Incidents involving the airline industry and the 
transportation industry (where relevant) were 
motivated primarily by revenge (40%), the benefit of 
a foreign entity (20%), and labor disputes (20%).  
 
5. Cyber-Safety Risk Management 
Approaches  
 
5.1. Promote Cyber-Safety Culture 
  
Some of the most effective solutions to seemingly 
technical problems are not technical at all.  They 
involve paradigm/mindset shifts that reveal new 
approaches to old challenges.  One of the most 
powerful approaches to cyber-safety risk 
management would be to broaden the current safety 
culture paradigm beyond realm of malfunctions and 
mistakes, to cyber-safety.  The safety culture and 
mindset adopted by the US aviation industry has 
produced a continuing downward trend in airline 
accidents over the past half-century, as shown in 
Figure 4 (McCarthy, 2018).   
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Airliner Accident Fatalities by year from 
1972 to 2017  
The Aviation Safety Network (ASN), an 
independent global aviation safety data resource, 
stated that 2017 was “the safest year ever, both by the 
number of fatal accidents as well as in terms of 
fatalities” (Shepardson, 2018).  These impressive 
safety records can be directly attributed to the 
aviation safety culture cultivated over many decades 
(Air Transport Action Group).  Updating this safety 
culture by adding a focus on cyber-safety will 
promote appropriately more skeptical, circumspect 
attitudes across the spectrum of operations, enabling 
and empowering a trust-but-verify approach to 
communications, navigation, weather data, and even 
flight-instrument displays.  The key will be to think 
beyond troubleshooting faults and anticipating 
predictable failure modes & effects to incorporating a 
sensitivity to intentional deception, manipulation, and 
misdirection, as well as a realization of the connected 
machine-to-machine environment that modern and 
future aircrews will operate in.  Throughout their 
training, pilots are imbued with the concept of 
attention management, i.e. knowing what to pay 
attention to and how much focus to apply at various 
times and states of flight (Stephens, et al., 2017).  A 
new concept and practice of aviation “Trust 
Management” may be well worth exploring.  
 
5.2. Creative Aviation Cyber-Safety 
Standards 
 
There is a significant infrastructure, vibrant 
community, and comprehensive body of aviation 
safety standards. The International Civil Aviation 
Organization began developing, updating, and 
publishing extensive Standards and Recommended 
Practices (SARP) on Safety Management in 2001, 
and considers safety “at the core of ICAO’s 
fundamental objectives” (International Civil 
Aeronautical Organization, n.d., p. 1).  The FAA 
Office of Safety Standards establishes safety 
standards across the spectrum of ground and flight 
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 operations, technology, and safety promotion (US 
Federal Aviation Administration, 2017).  These 
national and international safety governance bodies 
are supported by various industry groups, such as the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) and 
the US-based RTCA (formerly, Radio Technical 
Commission on Aeronautics) (RTCA, 2018).  
Fortunately, these organizations have recently begun 
to address cyber-safety challenges.  The ICAO issued 
a Declaration on Cybersecurity in Civil Aviation, at 
its first Cyber Summit, in 2017, with a specific call 
for “increasing the resilience of the global aviation 
system against cyber-threats that may jeopardize the 
safety…of civil aviation” (International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2017, p. 1).  The FAA, 
launching a multi-year effort to manage cyber-safety 
risks, assembled an Advisory Committee in 2015 to 
“develop standards and safeguards designed to detect, 
track and isolate data intrusions and other cyber-
attacks against aviation” (Edwards, 2016, p. 1).  The 
RTCA Special Committee 216: Aeronautical Systems 
Security, is now addressing cyber safety as well, with 
the expressed intent to “help ensure safe, secure and 
efficient operations amid the growing use of highly 
integrated electronic systems and network 
technologies used on-board aircraft” (RTCA, 2018). 
 
5.3. Adopt, Adapt, and Extend Terrestrial 
Cyber Risk Mitigation Technologies 
 
There are many well-developed and emerging 
technical approaches to mitigating terrestrial cyber 
risks.  These technologies are aimed at mitigating 
risks to information confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability.  Though confidentiality compromise is 
not necessarily a cyber-safety risk, integrity and 
availability of data and communication channels can 
be vital to safe flight.  The US Industrial Control 
System Computer Emergency Response Team (ICS-
CERT) has suggested some of these technical 
approaches.  They include network segmentation, 
firewalls, encrypted remote access, role-based access 
controls, system logging, continuous patching and 
updating, and compromise detection & alerting (US 
Computer Emergency Response Team, 2015).  
Technical approaches to IoT cybersecurity are 
highly applicable to aviation cyber-safety due to the 
tremendous growth in aircraft-embedded IoT devices.  
In their new book, Solutions for Cyber-Physical 
Systems Ubiquity, Austrian researcher Druml Norbert 
and his colleagues suggest a new technical approach, 
employing “self-adaptive software systems” may 
significantly increase IoT security via capabilities to 
“detect security attacks and isolate the infected 
devices or block the attackers” (Druml, Genser, 
Krieg, Menghin, & Hoeller, 2018, p. 312).  
 These three technical approaches to cyber 
risk mitigation are a small sampling of the many 
opportunities to for the aviation community to adopt, 
adapt, and extend terrestrial approaches to aviation 
cyber-safety.  They point to a rich and vital area for 
further investment, research, and development. 
 
6. Summary 
 
This report attempted to narrow the knowledge 
gap of the cyber-physical safety (cyber-safety) risks 
attending The Connected Aircraft.  It has shown that 
Connected Aircraft are, indeed, cyber-physical 
systems and has summarized three examples of 
airborne systems with significant cyber-safety risks:  
Integrated Modular Avionics Systems, Full Authority 
Digital Engine Controls, and next-generation aviation 
Health Management Systems. Next, it discussed the 
concept of the threat from within and how the 
interconnected aircraft can be especially vulnerable to 
insider attacks. Further, three approaches to cyber-
safety risk management:  building a cyber-safety 
culture, creating and promoting aviation cyber-safety 
standards, and adopting, adapting, and extending 
terrestrial cyber risk mitigation technologies to 
airborne cyber-physical systems, were also presented.  
Proactive work is underway and a great deal of vital 
investment, research, and experimentation lies ahead 
to protect Connected Aircraft and the traveling public 
from exposure to unacceptable cyber-safety risk. 
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